


The Impacts of Transnational Organized Crime on Citizen Security in the Americas and the Caribbean: A Primer for Parliamentarians



Transnational organized crime is a growing concern in the Americas and the Caribbean, with significant implications for regional security. Criminal organizations operating across the hemisphere are well-structured, highly resourced, and deeply interconnected, extending their influence and activities across borders. Although often framed as a regional security phenomenon, the devastating impacts of their operations—often including extreme violence—are most acutely felt at the national level, particularly by marginalized individuals and communities. Beyond threatening citizen security, organized crime also undermines sustainable development and weakens democratic institutions throughout the region.

Effectively addressing organized crime in the hemisphere remains a significant challenge, as it requires both responding to its immediate impact on citizen security and tackling the root causes that drive individuals to join criminal organizations and engage in violence. In response to these complex issues, parliamentarians can play a vital role in combating transnational organized crime and mitigating its effects on the population—both through national initiatives and by promoting regional cooperation.

This document is intended to support parliamentarians from the Americas and the Caribbean in understanding the diverse citizen security challenges posed by transnational organized crime in the hemisphere. It also outlines potential responses to help inform inclusive and effective parliamentary action on this issue across the region.

This primer forms part of a series of materials prepared for parliamentarians in advance of the X Summit of the Americas being held in December 2025, which is titled “Building a Secure and Sustainable Hemisphere with Shared Prosperity”. The content of this tool draws upon ParlAmericas’ virtual meeting “[The Evolving Landscape of Transnational Organized Crime](#),” held on June 20, 2025.

Understanding Transnational Organized Crime

- Criminal organizations are “structured groups of three or more persons acting in concert for a period of time, with the aim of committing at least one serious crime to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” ([United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime](#), 2003).
- The illegal activities of criminal organizations vary greatly and may include robbery, racketeering, trafficking (of persons, drugs, arms, wildlife, art, and other goods), smuggling, illegal extraction of natural resources, cybercrimes, control of local economies, sexual exploitation, money laundering, and

more. They often resort to extreme violence and use corruption and institutional infiltration to evade law enforcement.

- Organized crime becomes **transnational** when its activities and influence cross borders. This transnational dimension is best understood as an extension of domestic organized crime. Criminal organizations rarely operate exclusively across borders, making national-level interventions a critical component in addressing this regional and global phenomenon.
- In terms of personal threats posed by transnational organized crime, young men are most affected by homicide, while women and girls constitute the majority of victims of human trafficking and forced displacement.
- Young men are also the most likely to be recruited into criminal organizations and become perpetrators of violence, for reasons that will be discussed later in this document. While women do participate in organized crime – particularly as recruiters in human trafficking networks and as drug mules or producers¹ – men make up the majority of individuals involved.
- Organized crime undermines democratic institutions, fosters corruption, erodes public trust, captures local economies,² disrupts international relations, and obstructs sustainable development. **Its impacts are especially severe on historically marginalized individuals and populations, who are disproportionately affected by violence, exploitation, and the weakening of state services.**

Emerging and Evolving Trends in Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas and the Caribbean

Transnational organized crime in the Americas and Caribbean is evolving and becoming increasingly complex. Criminal organizations are expanding their markets, diversifying their sources of profit, and deepening their political influence and institutional infiltration.

Market expansion

Over the past decade, the cocaine trade has reached unprecedented levels, with production in South America doubling between 2013 and 2018. Traffickers are targeting new and less risky markets, such as Europe, while also expanding eastward toward Russia and Asia. As a result, Europe has become not only a destination but also a key transit hub for cocaine.

By contrast, the North American drug market has experienced a rapid surge in the production and trafficking of synthetic substances, particularly methamphetamines and fentanyl. In recent years, the misuse of these potent drugs has risen alarmingly across the region, contributing to a sharp increase in overdose deaths.

¹ [Roles of Women in Organized Crime - Insight Crime](#); [Women and Organized Crime in Latin America - Insight Crime](#)

² Organized crime captures local economies by infiltrating legitimate markets, coercing businesses to pay “taxes” and protection fees, laundering illicit profits, and distorting fair competition through the formation of local monopolies. This economic entrenchment often leads to a cycle of dependency and vulnerability that is difficult to break without coordinated institutional action.



Figure 1: Multiple routes for cocaine trafficking from Latin America and Caribbean towards Europe.

Source: McDermott, Jeremy, James Bargent, Douwe den Held, and Maria Fernanda Ramírez. *The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe*. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and insight Crime, February 2021. – Page 3

Diversification

Criminal organizations are expanding beyond the drug trade to include trafficking in persons, arms trafficking, wildlife and migrant smuggling, cybercrime, racketeering, and other illicit activities. This reach is also extending into legal markets such as the extraction of natural resources (e.g., minerals, timber, and fish), the construction industry, gambling, and control of supply chains.

When criminal organizations operate in markets that are not inherently illegal, law enforcement becomes even more challenging, as the line between legal and illegal becomes increasingly blurred.³ These operations are often conducted through legal fronts or in collusion with licensed actors, making detection and accountability

³ Despite the engagement of illegal actors in legal markets not being a new phenomenon, the purpose of this engagement is changing. Traditionally, these markets served primarily as channels for laundering profits from illegal activities. Today, however, criminal groups are treating these markets as sources of profit as well.

more difficult. Moreover, involvement in legal markets requires the corruption – or even the co-optation – of a broader range of public and private actors. This not only erodes good governance but also enhances the bargaining and political power of these groups.

Methods of payment are also evolving as a means of evading financial detection by law enforcement agencies. For example, North American criminals have been using firearms as payment for drugs trafficked through Latin American and Caribbean.

Political influence

In many Latin American countries, criminal organizations are expanding their influence over the local political sphere – targeting city halls and governors’ offices -- in a shift from their earlier focus on presidencies or national legislatures during the 1980s and 1990s. This strategy has proven more effective, allowing criminal groups to erode the rule of law and influence political decisions that benefit them, without the exposure or cost associated with national level involvement.

An additional dimension of this trend is increasing influence over local elections, often achieved through intimidation or vote-buying, sometimes by providing basic services to communities.

Criminal control over entire areas in urban peripheries is also a growing concern. This territorial dominance gives criminal groups significant power: it enables them to maintain internal order, repel rivals and law enforcement, and, in some cases, impose taxes on residents and businesses operating within these zones.

Citizen Security Implications of Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas and Caribbean

Transnational organized crime is often portrayed in media, policy discussions and international conventions as a phenomenon operating primarily in the international sphere, leading to the perception that states are its main victims. While states do suffer institutional and economic harm, this view overlooks the fact that criminal organizations are rooted in national contexts and that their most direct and devastating impacts are felt by individuals and communities.

Criminal organizations frequently use extreme violence – including sexual violence, torture, and homicide – as tools of intimidation, coercion, retaliation, and control over specific areas and populations. Levels of violence linked to organized crime tend to be higher in areas where rival factions compete for territorial or resource control. These conflicts often result in displacement of local populations seeking to escape the violence. Additionally, these groups are increasingly involved in trafficking in persons, which disproportionately affects women and girls.

Together, homicides, human trafficking, and displacement represent the primary threats to populations posed by transnational organized crime. **Additional data on each of these risks is presented below:**

Homicide ⁴

Today, violence linked to organized crime is responsible for more deaths globally than wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism combined.⁵ Latin America and the Caribbean are, by far, the regions most affected by this form of violence. Although several countries in the region - particularly in Central America - have recorded reductions in homicide rates, **the Americas and the Caribbean still have the highest regional homicide rate in the world.** While the global average stands at 5.8 homicides per 100,000 people, the rate in the Americas and Caribbean reached 20.2 in 2024. This represents over 120,000 homicides, half of which were linked to organized crime.⁶

Globally, the vast majority of homicide victims are men and boys, who account for an average of 81% of all victims. In Latin America and the Caribbean, this proportion rises to 91%, revealing a deeply gendered pattern of lethal violence. **Young men and boys aged 15-29 are especially vulnerable:** the homicide rate among this group reaches 53.6 per 100,000, compared to just 2.8 in Europe.⁷

Another critical aspect of homicide in the region is the prevalence of firearms. While the global average for firearm-related homicides is 40%, nearly 70% of homicides in the Americas and Caribbean involve firearms. These figures underscore the importance of addressing firearms trafficking as a key component of the citizen security threats posed by transnational organized crime.

Human trafficking

Human trafficking is the third largest source of illicit income for criminal organizations in Latin America, following drug and arms trafficking.⁸ According to the 2024 [Global Report on Trafficking in Persons by the UNODC](#), **human trafficking disproportionately affects women and girls.** In Central America and the Caribbean, 52% of victims are girls and 30% are women – together accounting for 82% of all trafficking victims. South America shows similar trends, with 45% of trafficked persons being women and 17% girls. Overall, 62% of human trafficking cases are linked to sexual exploitation.

⁴ Although organized crime is not the sole cause of homicides, homicide remains the most reliable indicator of organized criminal violence—particularly in the Americas and the Caribbean. In contrast, collecting data on other forms of violent crime often associated with criminal gangs, such as torture and sexual violence, and directly attributing them to organized crime is significantly more challenging for law enforcement agencies.

⁵ Armed conflicts and terrorism were responsible for 116,000 deaths globally, while 440,000 people were victims of intentional homicide. 40% of global homicides, or 176,000, are linked to organized crime ([Global Study on Homicide 2023](#) | UNODC).

⁶ To learn more about homicide rates and trends by country, see: [2024 Homicide Round-Up](#) | InSight Crime.

⁷ [Homicide and Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) | UNODC.

⁸ [Latin America's Success \(and Struggles\) in Fighting Human Trafficking](#) | InSight Crime.

Displacement

Widespread violence and organized crime are major drivers of forced displacement in the region. As criminal organizations expand their control, individuals are increasingly exposed to extortion, forced recruitment, and sexual and gender-based violence. For many—especially women and children—leaving becomes the only means of survival.

Haiti offers a stark example of how criminal activity can trigger a displacement crisis. Armed groups in the country often force entire communities from their homes as a tactic to eliminate state presence and suppress local resistance. By displacing residents, Haitian gangs create “buffer zones” between their strongholds and surrounding territories, providing a layer of protection against security operations.

As a result, more than 1.3 million people in Haiti are currently displaced—55% of whom are women and children. In 2024, displacement in Haiti accounted for three-quarters of all crime-induced displacement globally.⁹

The citizen security implications of transnational organized crime extends beyond direct physical violence. These realities can also affect families and entire communities emotionally and psychologically, due to the loss of loved ones and persistent fear for personal safety. Moreover, **the presence of criminal violence often creates a vicious cycle of political, social, and economic instability – disrupting the provision of basic public services, impeding sustainable development, and deepening inequalities and vulnerabilities.**

Data to remember:

- Homicide rates in the Americas and Caribbean are the highest in the world (20.2 per 100,000), with 50% of killings linked to organized crime and 91% of victims being men and boys.
- Firearms are used in nearly 70% of homicides in the region, far exceeding the global average.
- Human trafficking is a major revenue stream for criminal groups, with women and girls comprising over 80% of victims in Central America and the Caribbean, most of whom are trafficked for sexual exploitation.
- Criminal violence drives mass displacement: over 1 million in Haiti and millions in the Americas have been forcibly displaced, the majority of them women and children.

⁹ [The Weaponization of Displacement by Gangs in Haiti | Global Initiative.](#)

Addressing Citizen Security Risks Posed by Transnational Organized Crime

Addressing transnational organized crime requires a comprehensive approach that balances both **prevention and response**. For parliamentarians, this means advancing policies that not only curb violence and dismantle criminal networks, but also promote inclusive development, strengthen public institutions, and protect victims and the most vulnerable to violence, based on data reflecting the differential impacts they face.

Preventing Transnational Organized Crime

The most effective way to address organized crime is by preventing engagement in the first place – drawing on an understanding of who becomes involved in criminal activity and the root causes behind this participation. In the Americas and the Caribbean, as highlighted elsewhere in this document, young men make up the majority of the rank-and-file members in drug trafficking groups, militias, gangs, and other organized criminal entities.¹⁰ Analysis highlights two key factors that must be considered and addressed to prevent this reality:

- **The need for belonging, poverty, unemployment, lack of access to good education, and the pursuit of a better quality of life** are all considered by specialists to be key factors motivating participation in organized crime.¹¹ These risk factors closely align with concerns expressed across the region – particularly among young men living in disadvantaged communities – regarding limited access to quality education and decent employment opportunities.¹²
- The environment where boys grow up also plays a significant role in shaping their likelihood of engaging with criminal organizations. **Boys who witness violence committed by men or have relatives involved in criminal activity are more likely to follow a similar path.**¹³ This is especially relevant to consider in the Americas and the Caribbean, where 2022 data from [UNICEF](#) shows that nearly 2 in 3 children aged 1 to 14 experience violent discipline at home. Furthermore, with 1 in 4 women in the region having experienced physical and/or sexual violence by a partner at least once during their lives, the normalization of violence within the home is further heightened.¹⁴

Each of these factors is particularly influential for men engaging in organized crime because of the ways in which they alternately challenge or reinforce traditional notions of masculinity. Men have historically been viewed as providers, and when they are unable to fulfill this role through education and employment, criminal activity can appear to offer an alternative path. Joining criminal groups becomes a way to assert masculinity –

¹⁰ [Homicide and Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) | UNODC.

¹¹ For a more comprehensive look into recruitment and engagement in organized crime, see: *Beyond Money, Power, and Masculinity: Toward an Analytical Perspective on Recruitment to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations* | Chomczyński, Piotr A, Roger Guy, and Elena Azaola | International Sociology (2023).

¹² [Youth Perspectives in Latin America and the Caribbean; Evidence from Latinobarómetro survey](#) | JRC.

¹³ This also extends to other forms of violence, with research by [UN Women Caribbean](#) finding that “men exposed to domestic violence in childhood were more likely to become batterers or perpetrators of domestic violence in adulthood” (pg. 21).

¹⁴ [“At Least 11 Women Are Victims of Femicide Every Day in Latin America and the Caribbean,”](#) press release, ECLAC (November 22, 2024)

often by emulating behaviours associated with violence and domination that are harmfully linked to male identity. Ultimately, the prospect of gaining a sense of belonging, power, or social status makes organized crime seem like a desirable path for some as they transition from boyhood to manhood.

These realities underscore the importance of prevention strategies that address harmful gender stereotypes and respond to the economic disadvantages that drive vulnerability. At the same time, efforts to eliminate other forms of violence – such as family violence and gender-based violence – are essential and complementary priorities.



Example of a good practice for preventative action

[Becoming a Man \(BAM\)](#)

This school-based program is a civil society-led initiative based in Chicago, U.S. Designed for boys between 12 and 17 years-old in disadvantaged communities - especially Afro-Americans and Latinos - who are at risk of disengaging from school or getting involved in criminal activities. The program has weekly group sessions with individual mentoring, using cognitive behavioral therapy techniques to help participants recognize and change harmful patterns of thinking and behavior. BAM provides a safe space for young men to reflect on their lives, set goals, and build a healthier understanding of what it means to “be a man”. Studies have shown that BAM significantly reduced violent crime arrests and improved school attendance, with up to a 50% reduction in arrests and 19% increase in on-time high school graduation rates. The program is also cost-effective, as the expected long-term returns range from \$5 to \$30 for every dollar invested.

Prevention in your context - Key questions for parliamentarians to consider

- ? What are the primary risk factors in my country that make individuals - especially youth - more susceptible to recruitment by organized crime groups? How do these factors vary based on gender, location, socioeconomic status, and other identity characteristics?
- ? Do existing policies and programs adequately address the root causes of criminal involvement?
- ? Are there partnerships in place between government, civil society, and communities to implement and monitor preventative initiatives?

Responding to Transnational Organized Crime

Even though preventative strategies are the most effective, rights-based, and cost-efficient approach, response measures are also necessary to address criminal organizations that are already established and to mitigate the ongoing impacts of their activities.

The main strategy for countering organized crime in the Americas and the Caribbean has relied on incarceration and the deployment of police and military forces to combat criminal networks. This approach, however, has been associated with increases in urban violence, mass incarceration, racial profiling, and disproportionate, racially-targeted police violence – as well as deaths of law enforcement officers. It has also proven ineffective in fully curbing criminal activity at both domestic and transnational levels, as evidenced by the continued growth and evolving trends of organized crime in the region.

Moreover, mass incarceration has been linked to higher rates of youth engagement in criminal organizations, as prisons often serve as recruiting grounds.¹⁵ This approach is also costly, requiring billions of dollars in public spending across the region. These realities suggest the need for complementary measures to counter organized crime.¹⁶

While preventative strategies offer long-term solutions, measures that deliver medium- and short-term results are also essential to mitigate the immediate citizen security threats posed by criminal organizations. Achieving this requires an approach that also considers the needs of victims and those most vulnerable to violence, in order to create meaningful and sustainable outcomes. **Some key dimensions of a potential response plan are outlined below.**

- ✓ **Improving reporting channels and access to justice:** Ensuring access to justice and strengthening reporting mechanisms are fundamental for gathering intelligence on criminal networks and providing care to victims. The creation of anonymous reporting channels allow victims and witnesses to come forward while protecting them from retaliations by criminal actors. Crime-specific reporting mechanisms – such as sexual violence hotlines staffed by specially trained personnel – can offer a safer and more supportive environment for victims and survivors, increasing the likelihood of reporting. These mechanisms are essential not only for enabling victims to access the justice system but also for generating valuable intelligence that supports targeted operations against criminal networks.
- ✓ **Fostering multi-level and multi-actor cooperation:** Cooperation between national public security agencies, civil society organizations, and international bodies is vital for developing inclusive, rights-based, and effective responses to transnational organized crime. Each actor brings unique strengths: security agencies provide enforcement and intelligence capabilities; civil society organizations offer

¹⁵ Over the past 24 years, the incarceration rates in South and Central America have increased by 224% and 101%, respectively. ([The Hidden Costs of Mass Incarceration](#) | IISS)

¹⁶ [The War on Drugs: Wasting Billions and Undermining Economies](#) | [Transform Drug Policy Foundation](#); [The War on Drugs, Racial Meanings, and Structural Racism: A Holistic and Reproductive Approach](#) | Rosino and Hughey | [The American Journal of Economics and Sociology \(2018\)](#); ['War on Drugs' a Recipe for Rights Abuses in Mexico](#) | [InSight Crime](#); [Annual Study on Drug Policies and Public Opinion in Latin America 2014-2015](#) | IDPC; [The Economics Of The Drug War](#) | UNODC.

community-level, grass-roots insights, victim support, and advocacy for marginalized communities; and international organizations provide funding, technical expertise, and coordination across borders.

Cross-border cooperation between public security agencies is another pillar in combating transnational organized crime, as it enables intelligence sharing and facilitates joint investigative efforts.

Collaboration among these actors supports the identification of trends and the implementation of effective, harmonized strategies. It also helps build trust between state institutions and the public – an essential component of citizen security and democratic governance.

- ✓ **Fighting corruption and promoting good governance:** Corruption can occur at many levels and involve a range of actors – from a border security agent who accepts bribes to facilitate trafficking, to large companies laundering criminal proceeds, and politicians who overlook or even benefit from the activities of criminal organizations. Each level and type of corruption requires a tailored response.

However, there are common strategies that serve as foundational elements in combating corruption: protecting whistleblowers; promoting civic trust and engagement through partnerships with and the empowerment of civil society organizations; adopting international standards; and cooperating with international organizations to monitor public institutions and officials. Educational campaigns that raise awareness about the impacts of corruption, along with civic education programs that promote democratic values among youth, are also important long-term strategies. Additionally, ensuring the independence of government branches strengthens oversight and accountability mechanisms.

- ✓ **Border security:** Strengthening law enforcement along borders is essential to combat trafficking in persons, smuggling, and trafficking of drugs, arms, wildlife, and other illicit goods. Enhancing the technologies used by border control agents and providing better training to these agents can also be an effective and efficient strategy to improve detection and enforcement capabilities.



Examples of good practices for responsive action

[Disque Denúncia - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil](#)

The creation of the *Disque Denúncia* (Crime Reporting Hotline) in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1995, is a successful example of strategies crafted to mitigate under-reporting - one of the biggest challenges in countering criminal organizations. *Disque Denúncia* is a collaborative initiative between the government and the private sector that provides a confidential and fully anonymous tip line for the public that is available 24/7. Confidentiality is essential to tackle under-reporting as many victims and witnesses are afraid to come forward, fearing retaliation, and mistrusting law enforcement due to infiltration by criminal organizations and corruption. The initiative is funded privately, and all tips are forwarded to the Security

Secretariat of the municipality where the crime occurred. Over time, it has also become a valuable tool for police intelligence and data collection, especially when analyzing how such criminal activity evolves over time. The initiative's success has prompted many other Brazilian states to create their own *Disque Denúncias*, and to expand the idea into specialized reporting channels against sexual and gender-based violence and other specific crimes.

[Track4TIP - UNODC](#)

Transforming Alerts into Criminal Justice Responses to Combat Trafficking in Persons within Migration Flows (Track4TIP) was a regional initiative that operated between 2019 and 2024 led by the UNODC. Implemented in eight countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, the project aimed to strengthen the criminal justice response to human trafficking within migration flows, particularly involving Venezuelan migrants.

Using a victim-centered approach, Track4TIP had as its main objectives: 1) building national capacity to identify and allow victims to safely report cases of human trafficking; 2) conducting research and disseminating information to better inform migrants and help law enforcement agencies gather intelligence on human trafficking networks; and 3) enhancing regional coordination and cooperation for investigation and prosecution of human trafficking cases. The implementation of the program resulted in an increase in the number of prosecutions of human trafficking cases and in the identification of victims and survivors. The program also strengthened cooperation channels between national institutions and civil society organizations.¹⁷

Responding to transnational organized crime impacts in your context - Key questions for parliamentarians to consider:

- ? What role does our country play in transnational criminal networks—as a source, transit, or destination country, or in another capacity?
- ? How are criminal organizations affecting citizen security, fostering corruption, and undermining good governance in our country?
- ? Which communities and localities are most impacted? How are women, men, boys, and girls affected differently in those locations? Are there mechanisms in place to address their specific needs?
- ? How reliable are existing reporting channels, and what improvements could be made to strengthen these mechanisms and reduce under-reporting?

¹⁷ Despite having its mandate finished in 2024, the program left an important legacy to its participating countries, which can be shared through regional cooperation and engagement between national agencies, fostering capacity building across the hemisphere.

- ? Which actors—including civil society organizations and international organizations—are implementing effective community-level strategies to mitigate security risks and support victims/survivors and their families? How can I engage with these actors to build trust and promote citizen security?
- ? How well-funded, technologically equipped, and professionally trained are the border security services in my country?

Next Steps for Parliamentary Action

When addressing organized crime—whether transnational or domestic—it is essential to recognize that the state cannot act alone. Engaging civil society, international organizations, academia, and cooperating with other countries is crucial to fully understanding and effectively responding to this issue using evidence-based, victim-centered strategies. Experts also emphasize that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to preventing or addressing crime: while experiences can be shared, strategies must be tailored to each specific context.

With that in mind, the following are strategies and next steps that parliamentarians can pursue to support effective responses to transnational organized crime:

- ✓ **Familiarize yourself with international and regional agreements and instruments** related to organized crime and associated issues. This will strengthen your understanding of relevant standards and good practices and help assess national progress toward meeting commitments.¹⁸
- ✓ **Review national legislation** on organized crime and related topics to evaluate alignment with international and regional standards—particularly in addressing the specific vulnerabilities of women, men, girls, and boys to citizen security risks.
- ✓ **Seek out disaggregated data** on organized crime trends in your country, including who is most involved in and affected by criminal activity—disaggregated by sex, age, location, ethnicity, and other identity markers. Where such data is lacking, advocate for its collection.
- ✓ **Engage with think tanks, universities, and data-gathering agencies** to improve the quality and availability of data on organized crime and its impacts.
- ✓ **Advocate for the creation of crime-specific, anonymous reporting channels** to reduce under-reporting and improve access to justice and support services where needed. Ensure that individuals handling reports—especially those involving sexual or gender-based violence—receive appropriate training.
- ✓ **Strengthen partnerships with civil society organizations** and support community-based initiatives to build trust and create communication channels between civil society and the legislative sphere. Use

¹⁸ Some examples of instruments and agreements are the [Palermo Convention](#), [The Meetings of Ministers Responsible for Public Security \(MISPA\)](#), [IMPACS | CARICOM](#), [Caribbean Basin Security Initiative](#), [Central American Security Strategy | SICA](#), [Hemispheric Plan of Action Against Transnational Organized Crime | OAS](#), [Inter-American Convention Against Corruption \(B-58\) | OAS](#), [Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission \(CICAD\) | OAS](#), and [Department against Transnational Organized Crime \(DTCO\) | OAS](#).

insights from these partnerships to complement quantitative data with on-the-ground realities and inform legislative action.

- ✓ **Promote inclusive and accessible programs** that offer viable, long-term alternatives for youth vulnerable to recruitment by criminal organizations—particularly in the areas of education and quality employment.
- ✓ **Engage with international organizations** such as the UN Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund and UNODC’s International Network for Legislation on Drugs, as well as regional mechanisms like the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean’s Strategic Framework for Security and Justice, to access tailored information, funding, and capacity-building opportunities.
- ✓ **Collaborate with fellow parliamentarians across the Americas and the Caribbean** to share experiences, exchange good practices, and foster regional cooperation toward a harmonized legislative framework to combat transnational organized crime.

Helpful resources for data and analysis

- [InSight Crime](#) (reports available in English and Spanish)
 - [InSight Crime's 2024 Homicide Round-Up](#)
- [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime](#)
 - [Global Study on Homicide 2023](#)
 - [Homicide and Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean](#)
 - [Model Legislative Provisions against Organized Crime](#)
 - [Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2024 - UNODC](#)
- [International Drug Policy Consortium](#)
- [International Organization for Migration - Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean](#)
- [The International Institute for Strategic Studies](#)
- [Department against Transnational Organized Crime \(DTOC\) - OAS](#)
- [United Nations Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund](#)



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